Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Review of Ioan Chirilă, The Holy Bible - The Word of Words (Sfânta Scriptură – Cuvântul Cuvintelor), ( Cluj-Napoca: Editura Renaşterea, 2010), 415 p.

All these extracts are linked by his general epistemology, especially his distinction between two types of knowledge: ‘paradisiac’ or Type 1, which is that of everyday awareness and the current methods, concepts and presuppositions of the sciences of nature and humanity, plus mathematics and philosophy, and accumulates in ‘plus knowledge’ and resolves problems in standard ways; and ‘Luciferican’ or Type 2, which opens up the ‘mysteries’ of new realms of reality which do not fit the current methods, concepts and presuppositions, (...) and so results in ‘minus’ knowledge, the awareness that there are things which at the moment we cannot understand. For these ‘mysteries’ new methods, concepts and presuppositions are required, which ‘abyssal’ categories can supply, ones below those we normally employ and may be aware of. It is part of man’s role in the cosmos to reveal such mysteries.. (shrink)

The widespread opinion among conceptual historians is that political concepts are always contested in their actual usage. Religious concepts in modernity are also not only contested; they are constructed on an ontological contradiction. They imply that the object to which they refer exists, and at the same time that it does not. I demonstrate this idea using four religious concepts: _religion, God,_ the _beyond,_ and _spirit._ I conclude with discussion on the reality status of religious concepts in modern historiography and (...) religious studies. (shrink)

As Roger Ariew shows, one of the most fascinating challenges for the authors trying to create a Cartesian complete course on philosophy was coming up with a Cartesian Logic based on the existing texts of the master. Were the few simple rules from the Discourse on Method the "logic" of Descartes? Were the Rules for the Direction of the Mind "logic"? How can we even have a logic without syllogism? When looking at the authors studied by Ariew one finds that (...) the best that they could come up was adding some Cartesian elements on what remains basically a traditional Aristotelian Logic. It seems that there was no Cartesian Logic after all.I want to show here that Cartesian Logic is something else, not exactly... (shrink)

In the last decades, there has been a far-reaching debate about whether reason is a natural power of the human animal or a socio-historical achievement. This paper brings out and criticizes two paradigmatic views of reason entangled in that dilemma: the substantive view which construes reason as a primitive power possessing the basic forms of intelligibility; and the derivative view which traces back reason to non-rational, natural-historic processes. I approach the issue by discussing how Aristotle addresses the underlying predicament in (...) Metaphysics Theta. The predicament persuades us to overdetermine or underdetermine our natural potentiality for reason because it ignores what I call Aristotle's main insight: the understanding from which rational capacities are exercised is acquired by undertaking appropriate activities. The measure of rational capacities is neither merely naturally determined nor merely socio-historically inherited but relies on the engagement with the things falling under the purview of the pertaining activities. We must recover this Aristotelian insight, I argue, to avoid succumbing to either the substantive or the derivative view of reason. (shrink)

This article briefly compares and contrasts Kantian and Marxist thinking, trying to show how the second derived from the first.

Responding to the co-production of screen seriality and human subjectivity within contemporary machine cultures and economies of excess, this article examines televisual affect and proposes concepts that address the languages, components and processes of particular televisual subjectivities. Discussions focus on science fiction fantasy series Farscape – a space odyssey fascinated with biotechnological evolution and mutative consciousness. This article aims to invigorate and extend the critical analysis of contemporary televisual affect, taking up questions and methodologies from Félix Guattari’s machinic ontology and (...) Georges Bataille’s formulation of a sacrificial economy to address the conditions of consumption–production relevant to television today. (shrink)

Relatively recent literature on supposition theory seems to use different modern logical tools of interpretation that can be generally described as formalizations. Since the act of formalizing may be understood as a process of changing its object in the sense of making it more formal, an assessment of this kind of approaches is necessary. Accordingly, our main goal in this paper is to analyze the formality of Peter of Spain’s theory of supposition and to evaluate its interpretation as a quantification (...) theory. Our main thesis is that although Peter’s theory presents certain weak notions of formality, the formality presupposed by the quantificational interpretation is nowhere to be found in his considerations. (shrink)

The Hermotimus is Lucian’s longest piece of writing, surpassing even the two books of the True Tales, and at the same time his most successful effort to recreate the style and atmosphere of a Platonic dialogue, filled with a new—and for Lucian uncharacteristically serious—content, namely a sustained attack on “dogmatic” philosophical schools (the “haireseis” of its subtitle) and, inversely, a ringing endorsement of the tenets of Pyrrhonian Scepticism.... (review at BMCR).

'you'll find another man to harvest, Glycerion: let this one go' The Greek satirist Lucian was a brilliantly entertaining writer who invented the comic dialogue as a vehicle for satiric comment. His influence was immense, not only in the Greek world, but on later European writers such as Rabelais and Swift. His dialogues puncture the pretensions of pompous philosophers and describe the daily lives of Greek courtesans; they are peopled by politicians, historians and ordinary citizens, as well as by (...) gods and mythic figures. This selection provides a cross-section of Lucian's styles and satirical targets, from serious polemic to lighter squibs and character portrayals. It includes How to Write History and his most famous piece, A True History, a fabulous tale of space travel and a monstrous whale which prefigures the fantasies of Jules Verne. This lively new translation is both accurate and idiomatic, and the introduction highlights Lucian's importance in his own and later times. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Although David Mitrany’s international thought is not usually associated with the concept of the international anarchy, I argue that his analysis actually compares two forms of anarchical order. The first form is the order associated with the relations between states, while the second is his functional alternative to this order. The functional approach is anarchical in the sense that it remains an order without an orderer. In first analysing the dynamics and failings of the inter-state order, and then suggesting pragmatic (...) process-orientated solutions to those failings, I argue that Mitrany follows a similar approach to his classical realist contemporaries. (shrink)

In this paper I continue to explore some of the problems I believe one encounters when attempting to unravel the ontology of person. I maintain my interest for classical philosophical theories which were equally concerned with this matter. I draw upon Hume’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology by indicating their conceptual differences relevant to my current topic, but I adopt a thought-expe-rimental approach. That because, on the one hand, my purpose is not to reconstruct the logic of these philosophers in details, (...) but to select some of the features of their theories in order to later integrate them in what I hope it will become an improved philosophical analysis. On the other hand, I have reasons to believe, that any philosophical discussion about the ontology of person begins with implications which preclude the possibility of objective descriptions, if such descriptions are even possible, that being another way to argue that we cannot claim to have a science of person without clarifying the limits of philosophical conceivability. (shrink)

From a classical phenomenological point of view, to reason is to have a conscious intentional experience. A conscious experience can be described as a predicative reconstruction of whatever reason might be concerned with while the intentional aspect can be deduced from the effort of disclosing specialized propositional insights into whatever reasoning is concerned with. Husserl argued that the task of phenomenology is to pave the way toward a science of consciousness in which reason as key feature of conscious life will (...) be properly treated. However, contemporary phenomenology adopted an entirely different perspective on this matter. Conscious experiences are now described from a perspective reminiscent to traditional empiricism while the search for universal objectivity is abandoned in favor of contextual truths. The current situation raises several questions how did we get here, does making sense entail emotions, does the emotivist reconsideration of consciousness solve the problem of objectivity, should a future science of consciousness stress the role of emotions as a solution to subjectivism and yet to be considered a phenomenological science of consciousness. In this paper, I only begin to tackle these problems. (shrink)

Concerns regarding the possibility of a phenomenological science of consciousness emerged almost from its inception. Naturalism was quick to attack phenomenology. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others have too argued that a phenomenological science of consciousness can succeed if repositioning classical phenomenology from an existentialist perspective. One way to close this debate is to revisit several key classical phenomenological concepts. In this paper I depart from the premise that it is possible to have a phenomenological science of consciousness (...) but in order to do that we must distinguish between the problem of objectivity and the problem of consciousness keeping in mind that the two are intimately related. I will be discussing some of the differences between universally valid and experimental statements and make some remarks with respect to the phenomenological origins of consciousness without getting in too many details. The present purpose is to tackle some of these epistemological and ontological aspects pertaining to science and consciousness without making strong claims. (shrink)

Sandu Frunza, Filosofie şi Iudaism (Philosophy and Judaism) Ed. Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2006.

The present ecumenical inter-religious dia- logue is more centered on the relationship between politics and traditional forms of reli- giosity expressed at societal level. It is obvi- ous that after the events of 11th September 2001 the next century will be more focused on cultural and religious dimensions than the last one. From this perspective I present in this paper the stage of inter-religious dia- logue from major Christian churches’ point of view and how churches understand their role within the (...) broader European context and world affairs’ challenges. (shrink)

Self-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions (Liar-type or Grelling-type), or in the form of the so called limitative theorems in mathematical logic (e.g. Gödel’s theorem). By deriving Gödel’s significant results from paradoxical constructions the limitative character of such self-referential constructions is preserved, but (...) they open the ways for a new representation of a great variety of arguments in the field of logic, mathematics and philosophy. (shrink)

These manifestos for the future of world thought offer a uniquely global outlook by incorporating forceful examples from both western and non-western regions and placing important movements of western and non-western societies into a theoretical dialogue.

It characterizes studies in Brazilian Information Science that connect gender and/or women and the Knowledge Organization (KO). The study is characterized as exploratory, descriptive, presenting bibliographical research as a data collection procedure. The bibliographic research was carried out in the Information Science Database (BRAPCI) and in the Brazilian Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (BDTD). 42 scientific works were analyzed, including articles, dissertations, and theses. The first publication on the subject in the literature analyzed is from 2010, highlighting its incipience, (...) considering that 58% of publications are from 2017 to the present. Considering their objectives, the research was categorized into the three dimensions of ISKO-Brazil: epistemological, applied, political, and social. 22% of the research was categorized into the epistemological dimension, 39% into the applied dimension, and 39% into the political and social dimension. The epistemological dimension of KO concerning gender presents significant challenges, but also opportunities for theoretical and methodological advances that can contribute to a fairer and more inclusive representation of knowledge. Critical analysis of the work shows that, although there is progress, it is still incipient to ensure that KO is truly inclusive and representative of diverse gender identities. (shrink)

There is an interesting historical detour in the dissemination of one of the seventeenth century’s most praised discoveries: the reception of Harvey’s account of the circulation of the blood is closely intertwined, especially in the Low Countries, with Descartes’ account of the origin of the heartbeat. Descartes was one of the first figures to support the circulation of the blood and to give credit to Harvey for it, although he presumably arrived at the same conclusion independently through his own anatomical (...) experiments. He did so while vocally rejecting Harvey’s views on the muscular nature of the heart and his explanation of cardiac motion, to promote his own mechanistic solutions instead. Although Descartes’ .. (shrink)

This essay deals with metaphilosophical issues, i.e., different ways of “doing philosophy” and their possible applications for the formulation of a properly Brazilian philosophy. The arguments are drawn from questions that constitute the instigating and pertinent book by Gonçalo Palácios entitled De como fazer filosofia sem ser grego, estar morto ou ser gênio. In order to problematize the increasingly explored question of whether there is a Brazilian philosophy, firstly, I interact with some problems raised in the mentioned work, such as (...) academic philosophical practice, its attachment to the exegesis of works consecrated by tradition, and the consequent subdivision between history of philosophy and “philosophizing” through specific problems of national reality. Next, I articulate some elements that allow us to characterize a specifically Brazilian philosophy. To carry out this characterization, it is essential to critically articulate the relationship between philosophy teaching, in both school and academic level, with the philosophical tradition and its adjacent concepts. (shrink)

Objectivity is one of the oldest of problems in philosophy. Plato, Aristotle and others strived to provide a definitive solution. One of Husserl’s strategies was to introduce a distinction between “sciences of matters of fact” and “eidetic sciences” where the transition from the first science to the second science is possible via intentional sifting which is not to say that something becomes objective because one intends it. For Husserl intentional sifting is cognitive, hence phenomenology should begin by describing “the essence (...) of thinking” in order to later become a genuine science of consciousness. But inside the phenomenological movement there are profound disagreements with respect to the ontology of cognition and intentionality. Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty opted for emotional descriptions of thinking. With few exceptions, contemporary phenomenology has become the praise of emotional experience. In this paper I take the opposite path and make the case for cognitive-intentional character of consciousness I consider one of the most important problems of contemporary philosophy and psychology. I follow the assumption that the only way to generate objective propositions is to assume, against current views, that Husserl was not an idealist and that we can speak about cognition without reducing to emotion and yet without committing to dualism. (shrink)

Philosophy has been dominated by the view that emotions do a perfect job in producing knowledge about the inner and the outer world. Until recently this was the mark of standard naturalism but with the early Sartre and Merleau-Ponty it became central to contemporary phenomenology. In part because there is a persistent difficulty in understanding the relation between reasoning and feeling. In part because there is no scientific evidence for the ability to reason. There are many accounts of emotion but (...) few attempts to understand reasoning. My assumption is that emotions assist only with collecting data while reasoning is responsible for generating meaning about the inner and outer world. In order to understand that, we must approach reasoning without mixing ontology with metaphysics. Second, we must provide a compelling realistic model of reasoning. In this paper I sketch out a version of it. Overall, I argue that that we must find a way to re-integrate reasoning within the contemporary philosophical and scientific vocabulary if we wish to understand the conscious mind. (shrink)

The article discusses the beginning and the end of the »age of secularisation«: Differening from other definitions it argues for a late beginning after the Second World War and an early end by the mid-1980s. The age of secularisation is characterised by an open relationship of the churches to secular society - the exact character of which, however, was much disputed among reformers and conservatives within the churches. By the mid-1980s this openness began to be replaced by a more self (...) concerned attitude of the churches, which today causes some problems for the interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

Hegel und Heidegger teilen die Ansicht, dass das, was den Bedeutungsgehalt von Begriffen konstituiert, in ihrer unmittelbaren Verständlichkeit verborgen liegt. Dieser Gedanke bildet den Kern einer Konzeption der Negativität im Sinne einer Auffassung der Art und Weise, in der Sinn von Latenz geprägt ist. Hegel und Heidegger verstehen aber die Natur jener Latenz und das Verhältnis von Sinn und Begriff verschieden. Denn mit einer solchen Konzeption der Negativität ist die Frage verbunden, ob die Konstitution von Sinn begrifflich artikulierbar ist und (...) ob Sinn überhaupt begrifflich verfasst ist. Dieser Frage geht das Buch nach, indem es Hegel und Heidegger in ein Gespräch bringt, um den Stellenwert des begrifflichen Vermögens in der Konstitution und Artikulation von Sinn zu klären. Dabei wird eine Kritik an der Auffassung formuliert, dass die Quelle von Sinn nichtbegrifflich und unbegreiflich ist, und argumentiert, dass nur die begriffliche Artikulation von Bedeutungen die semantische Fülle der Welt verbürgt. (shrink)

Due to some unknown informants who offered illegally attained bank data on tax evaders to the German authorities, a fierce dispute has arisen as to whether or not the authorities are entitled to purchase these data. Now, the set of arguments in the dispute can be neatly subdivided into the two groups pro and contra, the former being consequentialist and the latter deontic. Hence, to solve the problem, one has to take a look at the conflict between consequentialist and deontic (...) systems. Here, the conflict will be cast into a social choice paradox showing the impossibility of Paretian ethical decisions which is akin to Sen’s Liberal Paradox and which can be generalized to a paradox asserting the impossibility of Neutral ethical decisions. Because of the fundamental character of the conflict, all solutions will be in some way defective. But, as is argued in the last section, for instance the idea of voluntary declaration provides a strategically convincing solution, if it is combined with the threat of disclosing relevant information. Hence, an ethically insoluble problem may well have a strategic solution. (shrink)

Neste artigo, trato de algumas das especificidades da neurofilosofia de Catherine Malabou. Parto da sua caracterização do conceito de plasticidade como crítica ao modo como as posições de orientação naturalista tendem a definir o “neuronal” como um termo objetivo. Em seguida, considero que, apesar de sua crítica à posição antirreducionista fenomenológica, o seu próprio modelo de materialismo é pós-fenomenológico por assimilar alguns aspectos da fenomenologia clássica, mas acrescentando novos elementos conceituais que a distanciam dos materialismos que compõem a filosofia analítica (...) da mente. Ao assimilar alguns pressupostos materialistas, como a análise do cérebro e das sinapses neuronais; e fenomenológicos, no que se refere à constituição experiencial da fisiologia do cérebro, Malabou utiliza a noção de personalidade orgânica ou de proto-self. O significado desses termos implica mais do que a referência conceitual às ciências cognitivas, pois que é preciso compreender a neurofilosofia de Malabou também sob à luz da historicidade do cérebro, em um sentido não-teleológico. (shrink)